Exporting democracy: German political foundations in Central‐East Europe

Abstract

In the liberal political tradition, representative government, civil society and some form of market are widely regarded as indispensable ingredients of democracy. The first two are essentially ‘home grown’, embedded in the enduring, albeit not immutable, political culture of a given society if they are to have substance as well as form. None the less, western democracies have been actively engaged in transplanting organizations to bolster civil society, along with political institutions, constitutions, and legal codes to Central‐East Europe (CEE) since 1989 as part of their democratization assistance. This article examines if, and how, external assistance can intervene constructively to promote the development of democracy. A brief discussion of western assumptions about post‐communist society in CEE is followed by a review of the roles assigned to culture and institutions in the transition literature which undergird these assumptions. The comparative cultural advantages of the United States and Germany ‐ the two primary western actors in the region ‐ are outlined, coupled with a more detailed examination of German political foundation engagement in CEE. The German political foundations were selected to anchor the study empirically because in terms of method and strategy, resources and level of engagement, they do everything right according to studies critical of western democratization assistance. In addition, their home political culture is very similar to that of the host societies in CEE. In short, their operational conditions present a best case scenario. None the less, the study shows that in some of their highest priority, politically motivated projects, the foundations have not made much of an impression on the CEE landscape. New parties and labour unions they supported have failed or are terminally ill. Many new non‐governmental organizations have been set up but their sustainability is open to question. Projecting donor preferences onto CEE is integral to the problem. The greatest risk is to fabricate the appearance of deep‐rooted democracy by focusing on form at the expense of content. The proliferation of parties and nongovernmental organizations per se tells us little about their ability to integrate the public actively and constructively into the new systems.