Export of Institutions and Problem of Secession

Abstract

The transition of many states at the end of the twentieth century to democratic forms of government was called to increase the efficiency and transparency of the activities of representative bodies of power. Along with the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in relation between Centre, regions and municipalities, this was to strengthen the state system. However, for many post-Soviet and developing countries, the import of Western democratic institutions was accompanied (and is accompanied) by the destruction of territorial integrity and the growth of corruption. This undermines the confidence of citizens in liberal democracy and causes nostalgia for a «strong hand». The work is devoted to the analysis of the problems associated with the export of democracy to the countries with middle and low income per capita. Economic theory due to the implicit assumption of homogeneity of the socio-economic space as usual. In connection this, the problem of secession is ignored, becomes relevant for the country-importer of Western democratic institutions. The export of institutions is an effective and rentable substitute for military-political operations for exporting countries. A paradoxical addition to these exports is the corruption of local elites, which contributes to allied relations with West or the transition of the political and economic establishment to the «external management» regime. An essential feature of modernity is the prohibition of territorial seizures, which contributes to an increase in the number of states. However, a significant part of them has only negative sovereignty, being unable to provide its citizens with the necessary amount of public goods.