Abstract
Belief allows us to coordinate our thought with our action. As Ramsey famously puts it, belief is a map by which we steer. For belief to play its role, on the one hand it must be stable under certain kinds of informational change; on the other hand it must be sensitive to changing evidence. Keeping belief stability in mind, we can ask about the norms that govern belief change in circumstances where there is epistemic pressure on us to change our belief. One such circumstance involves interpersonal conflict—in cases of disagreement with others. Another such circumstance involves intrapersonal conflict—the case of epistemic temptation. In this paper, I focus on a particular epistemic temptation case to explore what is rationally permitted and what is rationally required for us to do in the name of stability of belief.
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