Abstract
Identifying the motives underpinning punishment is crucial for understanding its evolved function. In principle, punishment of distributional inequality could be motivated by the desire to reciprocate losses ('revenge') or by the desire to reduce payoff asymmetries between the punisher and the target ('inequality aversion'). By separating these two possible motivations, recent work suggests that punishment is more likely to be motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion than by a desire for revenge. Nevertheless, these findings have not consistently replicated across different studies. Here, we suggest that considering country of origin—previously overlooked as a possible source of variation in responses—is important for understanding when and why individuals punish one another. We conducted a two-player stealing game with punishment, using data from 2,400 subjects recruited from the USA and India. US-based subjects punished in response to losses and disadvantageous inequality, but seldom invested in antisocial punishment (defined here as punishment of non-stealing partners). India-based subjects, on the other hand, punished at higher levels than US-based subjects and, so long as they did not experience disadvantageous inequality, punished stealing and non-stealing partners indiscriminately. Nevertheless, as in the USA, when stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality, India-based subjects punished stealing partners more than non-stealing partners. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that variation in punitive behavior varies across societies, and support the idea that punishment might sometimes function to improve relative status, rather than to enforce cooperation.
Highlights
The factors underpinning decisions to cooperate and to punish others have traditionally been studied in stylized economic games in laboratories, mostly using Western undergraduates as the representative sample [1,2,3,4]
Individuals that interact with cheating partners often experience negative emotions, and the strength of these emotions predicts investment in costly punishment [3, 5,6,7,8]
In stereotypical laboratory games, cheats typically end up with higher payoffs than cooperators meaning that, in addition to losses, victims experience disadvantageous inequality. This raises an alternative possibility: that punishment is motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion [9]
Summary
The factors underpinning decisions to cooperate and to punish others have traditionally been studied in stylized economic games in laboratories, mostly using Western undergraduates as the representative sample [1,2,3,4]. Individuals that interact with cheating partners often experience negative emotions, and the strength of these emotions predicts investment in costly punishment [3, 5,6,7,8]. In stereotypical laboratory games, cheats typically end up with higher payoffs than cooperators meaning that, in addition to losses, victims experience disadvantageous inequality. This raises an alternative possibility: that punishment is motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion (the willingness to give up material payoffs to avoid receiving a lower payoff than others [17]) [9]. Punitive sentiments that are motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion (rather than a desire for revenge) are arguably more consistent with the idea of a fitness-leveling, rather than a deterrent, function of punishment [18]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
