Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effects of different types of government policies related to environmental pollution liability insurance (EPLI) and how these policies promote the demand for EPLI of polluting enterprises. Based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB), we establish a research framework to analyze the effects and mechanisms of the three different policies (mandatory, incentive, and monitoring policies). Our empirical results suggest that the mandatory and monitoring policies can effectively promote companies to buy insurance, but the incentive policies have no significant impact on the insurance demand overall. Furthermore, companies with more positive environmental attitudes are not sensitive to mandatory policies. Although the overall effect of incentive policies is not significant, they have a significant positive impact on the EPLI demand of non-state-owned companies. The monitoring policies prompt enterprises to purchase insurance by strengthening information disclosure and compliant production.

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