Abstract
As the two most important nodes in the tourism supply chain, the competition, as well as the cooperation relationship between scenic spots and tourism enterprises, has a profound impact on the healthy development of the tourism industry. In this paper, we establish a dual-channel tourism supply chain model by making many assumptions about the operations of scenic spots and tourism enterprises. According to repeated game theory, we find that there is a certain trigger strategy for equilibrium strategy between scenic spots and tourism enterprises, and the cooperation-cooperation strategy is the optimal choice for scenic spots and tourism enterprises at this time.
Highlights
In recent years, tourism is booming worldwide because the living standards of people around the world have been improved, and governments around the world are strongly supporting and promoting it
This paper focuses on the analysis of the cooperation-cooperation mode between scenic spots and tourism enterprises under dual channels, and we explore the problem of equilibrium strategies for both
The quality of service experience brought to tourists by purchasing tickets for a single scenic spot through direct sales channels is recorded as SSdd, and the quality of service experience brought to tourists by purchasing package tour products through the tourism enterprise is recorded as SSaa
Summary
Tourism is booming worldwide because the living standards of people around the world have been improved, and governments around the world are strongly supporting and promoting it. Tickets are an important source of revenue for the tourism industry [2]. Scenic spots often adopt a dual-channel model to sell tickets. Scenic spots sell tickets directly to tourists through their direct channels, and on the other hand, scenic spots rely on tourism enterprises, such as tourist hotels, travel agencies, B&Bs and other agency channels [3]. This paper focuses on the analysis of the cooperation-cooperation mode between scenic spots and tourism enterprises under dual channels, and we explore the problem of equilibrium strategies for both
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