Abstract
AbstractRepresentationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representationalism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e. suitably mind‐independent) properties. I explore subjective representationalism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably mind‐dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion‐free phenomenal inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so‐called transparency of experience, as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objective representationalism.
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