Exploring negative territory Carbon dioxide removal and climate policy initiatives

Abstract

process of CDR. Thus the policy and regulatory frameworks governing CRD activities must be tailored to each particular approach. Moreover, policy differentiation is not just about selecting preferred techniques, but above all about ensuring that techniques that are deployed are implemented appropriately. For example, some studies suggest that poorly implemented BEECS strategies could actually increase GHG emissions through indirect land use changes (for example, energy crops displacing food production and encouraging additional forest clearances) (Creutzig et al. 2012). One could imagine governments directly financing activities to draw down CO2 as a public good, but the thrust of climate policy to this point has been to make emitting entities responsible for abatement, and to enlist the price mechanism (through a carbon tax or cap and trade system) to encourage adaptation across the economy. On this model, CDR activities would result in carbon dioxide reduction credits. Whichever CDR approaches are favored, their integration into mitigation frameworks requires mechanisms to: a) establish atmospheric withdrawals are actually taking place at the intended levels, b) ensure the long term security of the sequestered carbon, and c) minimize collateral damage. Quantitative verification of CO2 flows is required for national greenhouse gas inventories and compliance with international accords; but it is also critical for businesses. While reasonably accurate estimates of emissions and emissions reductions can be made from data on fossil fuel consumption, things are more complex with removals. Consider forests: actual CO2 uptake varies according to forest types, species mix, maturity, and climactic conditions. Carbon uptake will be spread over decades and historic data on forest growth may prove misleading, especially as the climate changes. While quantifying CO2 sent for geological storage from BECCS or air capture may be reasonably straightforward, the same is far from true for biochar, enhanced weathering or ocean fertilization. This implies strict protocols for the operation of CDR projects, and appropriate measurement and verification regimes. For CDR to be effective, sequestration must be for the long term. What happens if a newly planted forest is eroded by agriculture, settlement, fire, or insect attack; if geologic storage for air capture or BECCS proves insecure; or fraud exaggerates long term sequestration figures? In many cases measurement and monitoring will have to continue for the long term. It also implies the preparation of appropriate remediation and compensation plans (if storage breaks down) and associated liability regimes. With respect to collateral damage, the standard assumption is that CDR would be pursued because it could be secured at favorable cost as compared to emissions abatement options. But this is only to the overall benefit of society if the full social cost (as opposed to the cost for the specific actors realizing a project) is lower for the CDR pathway. This means other ‘externalities’ accompanying CDR projects must be taken into consideration. Ultimately, the only way to deal with these is by the regulation of authorized technologies/approaches by public authorities: on the one hand, through international rules relating to each CRD class (with project compliance a pre-condition for international recognition of carbon removal credits); and on the other, through national and local rules relating to land use planning, environmental and safety issues, and so on. But the difficulty which policy systems have in managing issues of such complexity, with multiple cross-cutting interconnections and uncertainties, cannot be overstated (Meadowcroft 2007). A recurrent theme in the political science literature is the incremental, contingent and fragmented character of policy making in modern democracies; and the difficulty in pursuing ‘rational-comprehensive’ approaches to problem solving (Lindblom 1979; Kingdon 1984). It is impossible to anticipate in advance all the consequences from hypothetical CDR projects. Only with time will some impacts be appreciated, and will the benefits and costs of each CDR option be fully understood. Appropriate policy frameworks must therefore 144 Climatic Change (2013) 118:137–149