Exploring Central Philosophical Concepts in Benefit Sharing: Vulnerability, Exploitation and Undue Inducement

Abstract

The philosophical principle behind benefit sharing is simple. Those who contribute to scientific research ought to share in its benefits. This is a matter of justice. If benefit sharing does not take place, exploitation may have occurred. Such exploitation is particularly problematic if it involves vulnerable populations. To counter the claim that contributors to research ought to receive benefits, the spectre of ‘undue inducement’ has been raised: vulnerable populations should not be offered benefits for taking part in research, otherwise they might consent to participate against their better judgment – and the more vulnerable the population is, the more of an inducement even the smallest benefit could be. Global research ethics aims to avoid both the exploitation of research participants and undue inducement; as neither is morally acceptable. This chapter charts the philosophical groundings of the debate by defining vulnerability, exploitation and undue inducement. It concludes that in research which involves only minimal risk for participants, such as the donation of genetic samples, concerns about undue inducement are largely misplaced, and should not be used by researchers and funders to circumvent their clear benefit sharing responsibilities.