Exploring an Effective Incentive System on a Groupware

Abstract

Groupware is an effective form of media for knowledge sharing and active open communication. One remaining important issue is how to design groupware in which vast amounts of beneficial content are provided and active discussion is facilitated. The behavior of information in such a medium resembles public-goods games because users voluntarily post beneficial information that creates media values. Many studies on such games have shown the effects of rewards or punishments in promoting cooperative behavior. In this paper, we show what types of incentive systems of rewards and punishments promote and maintain effective information behaviors or cooperative regimes in actual groupware. Our agent-based simulation demonstrates that a meta-reward system in which rewarders can gain other benefits for their own reward actions will probably encourage cooperation. Counterintuitively, our simulation also demonstrates that a system that applies sanctioning functions does not necessarily promote cooperation. Interestingly, a first-order reward system without any second-order incentives impedes the formation of cooperative regimes, while this is not the case with first-order punishment systems without second-order incentives. These findings may elucidate how successful groupware operates.