Exploring active attacks for three incorrect implementations of the ISO/IEC 9798 in satellite networks

Abstract

A variety of satellite authentication protocols have been proposed to meet the requirements of the security and efficiency in satellite communication networks nowadays. Most of them are variants from entity authentication technical standards published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission(IEC), or Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), etc. Unfortunately, the variants will be error-prone if technicians do not faithfully implement the standard procedure. In this article, we explore three potential incorrect implementations of the ISO/IEC 9798-2 and ISO/IEC 9798-3 technical standards for enhancing the performance in satellite communication networks. Specifically, we show the concrete attack steps and analyze the reasons for the success of the attack. We then design a simulation platform, and evaluate the performance for the correct implementation in the case of the ISO/IEC 9798-2.