Abstract

It is often maintained that, since the buying and selling of organs—particularly the kidneys—of living people supposedly constitutes exploitation of the living vendors while the so-called “altruistic” donation of them does not, the former, unlike the latter, should be a crime. This paper challenges and rejects this view. A novel account of exploitation, influenced by but different from those of Zwolinski and Wertheimer and of Wilkinson, is developed. Exploitation is seen as a sort of injustice. A distinction is made between justice and fairness. To exploit someone is to take advantage of him or her unjustly. Exploitation pertains to the nature of actions, interactions, and transaction rather than to their outcomes or to how they are perceived by exploitees. Desperation on the part of one or other of the parties to a transaction does not preclude the giving of valid consent to the transaction. Disparities of power or wealth between the parties to a transaction do not indicate or entail that the transaction will be exploitative. A disparity in the benefits that arise from a transaction between the parties does not indicate or entail that exploitation has taken place.

Highlights

  • In the United Kingdom and in most other countries, it is a crime to buy and sell organs of living human beings but not to donate them “altruistically” (Greasley 2014; Koplin 2018; McLachlan 1998, 1999; Saunders 2018)

  • A common suggested justification for this difference in treatment is the assertion that the former arrangement, unlike the latter one, entails the exploitation of the organ providers

  • I shall argue that the purchase of an organ of a living human being is inherently no more exploitative for the seller than for the buyer and inherently exploitative for neither of them

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Summary

Introduction

In the United Kingdom and in most other countries, it is a crime to buy and sell organs of living human beings but not to donate them “altruistically” (Greasley 2014; Koplin 2018; McLachlan 1998, 1999; Saunders 2018). A common suggested justification for this difference in treatment is the assertion that the former arrangement, unlike the latter one, entails the exploitation of the organ providers. It does not follow that if and when the selling of the organs of living human beings is exploitative, it should be illegal. I shall argue that the purchase of an organ of a living human being is inherently no more exploitative for the seller than for the buyer and inherently exploitative for neither of them. I shall base my case on an analysis of “exploitation” that is influenced by but differs in significant respects from that of Zwolinski and Wertheimer and that of Wilkinson (Wertheimer 1996; Wilkinson 2003a, 2003b; McLachlan and Swales 2001; Zwolinski and Wertheimer 2016)

Exploitation as Unjust Advantage Taking
Zwolinski and Wertheimer and Exploitation
Exploitation and Vulnerability
Advantage Taking and the Sale of Kidneys
Disparities of Power and the Sale of Kidneys
Disparities of Benefits and the Sale of Kidneys
The Sale of Kidneys and the Vulnerability of Donors
Conclusion
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