Explanatory Practice in Family Studies

Abstract

The question What is an explanation? rarely is asked by family scholars. Despite this, their collective explanatory endeavor seems neither haphazard nor purely idiosyncratic. Explaining something, on the whole, tends to be seen as different from trying to understand it, the latter offering a deeper but also a less rigorous type of knowing. Our explanatory practice reflects a pecking order in which theorizing outranks conceptual analysis and mere description. Usually, the last two approaches are not seen to be explanatory at all. A few quotes from recent work by established family scholars may serve to illustrate the foregoing. First, two statements lifted from a chapter titled Family Power by Szinovacz (1987): is only when we attempt to explain or predict power that a dynamic conceptualization and careful investigation of 'powering' become necessary (p. 656) and For a descriptive analysis of power, a static model of control may suffice, but an explanation of power relations must reflect the complexity and dynamics of ongoing 'powering' processes (p. 659). Explanation, in these statements, entails both prediction and dynamic conceptualization, in contrast to a static descriptive analysis. A second example, from an essay on the history of theorizing in the family field, is equally telling: Theory is explanation; it answers the questions how, why, under conditions. It is not description, myth or legend, or ideology (Adams & Steinmetz, 1993, p. 75). Here, explaining appears as an integral aspect of theorizing and is linked to specific modes of questioning. Contrary to the above views, I see explaining as a sense-making activity that, depending on its specific context, can be descriptive, conceptual, or theoretical. In other words, what an explanation is, or can be or ought to be, depends in any given case upon its context and upon the character of the inquiry in which it occurs (Gallie, 1969 p. 20). My stance essentially reflects an image of marriage and family process as one of collective survival and potential prospering, under complex and basically uncertain conditions. Explanations of marriage and family living-and of the institutional arrangements that fashion reproduction and the care of offspring in our society--thus must be sought at the crossroads of several scholarly fields. This has led to a discipline marked by a heterogeneity of focus, differing and, at times, conflicting interests, and a discourse characterized by dissensus as well as consensus (Sprey, 1990). This, in turn, suggests an explanatory enterprise that allows for the management--not necessarily the resolution--of the intellectual and ideological disputes that are likely to continue as an integral aspect of family studies. This essay is about explaining as a process and as the outcomes of that process. It is not meant to be a purely theoretical effort, nor does it aim to present specific recipes for the explanation of phenomena and events. I intend to make a case rather than to prove one. In line with this, my argument is fashioned by following the common scientific practice of the persuasive use of citations (Kellert, 1993, p. xii). After a brief treatment of explanation per se--especially the logic of its questioning and its predictive power--description, conceptualization, and theorizing are dealt with in turn as explanatory strategies in the family field. ON EXPLANATION An explanation is a statement designed to make sense of something that, so far, remains poorly understood and inadequately accounted for. It is the answer to a question and, in that capacity, must accomplish two things. First, the curiosity of those asking the question should be satisfied. Secondly, especially in scholarly domains of inquiry, the explanation should provide credible and relevant information. Pragmatically speaking, one could argue that an explanation has served its purpose when the curiosity of its questioners is satisfied. …