Explanation, Prediction, Scientific Systematization and Non-Explanatory Information

Abstract

In the course of the discussion of an unimportant question important features may come to light. This certainly was the case in the dispute over the problem of similarity or dissimilarity between explanation and prediction; it gave us new insights into the enormous varieties of possible applications of scientific theories to concrete events, though the question itself does not seem to be a very important one. Strangely enough, this very question has not been settled up to now. This is partly due to the vagueness and ambiguity of four classes of terms used in this dispute: (1) the terms ’explanation’ and ’prediction’ themselves; (2) expressions such as ’structural similarity’ and ’structural divergence’ which are used in the formulation of the thesis and counterthesis in question; (3) the distinction between what is ’given’ and what is ’provided later’; (4) the difference between ’reasons of belief’ and ’grounds of events’. With respect to (1) and (2) an attempt will be made to give an explication; (3) will be settled by a simple decision; as far as (4) is concerned no suggestion will be made how to explicate these concepts, but in Section 3 an argument will be based on this intuitive distinction.