Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the differences in farmland rent prices between land transferors and different transferees when considering the quality supervision cost of the transferred farmland. Moreover, the impact of the intervention of township governments, village committees, and other intermediary organizations on the rent price differences is also taken into consideration. The treatment effect model (TEM) and grouping regression model were used. The results showed that: (1) Owing to the different transaction costs, when leasing to village transferees, the land rent was significantly lower than when leasing to non-village transferees. (2) With the intervention of intermediary organizations, such as township governments and village committees, the constraints of the reputation mechanism between acquaintances were weakened, and the cost of information identification when land transferors searched for out-of-town transferees was reduced. As a result, the differences in land rent when transferring to the village and non-village transferees were narrowed. This study presents a different view to explain the transaction characteristics of the rural land transfer market in China. Further, it is of paramount importance to implement an effective public intervention, including strengthening the intermediary role of township governments and village committees, which is conducive to improving the rural land transfer market of most developing countries, including China.

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