Explaining Why There is Something Rather than Nothing

Andrew Brenner

doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00277-6

Abstract

It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The suggestion is that there may be something rather than nothing in virtue of the truth of certain sorts of subjunctive conditionals.

Highlights

This paper concerns the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The words “why is there something rather than nothing?” have been used to ask a number of distinct questions (Brenner 2016)—e.g., “why are there any contingent things?”, “why are there any concrete things?”, “why does anything whatsoever exist?” Despite the fact that the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” can be read in multiple ways, it will often prove useful to understand this sentence as if it refers to a single determinate question
Many philosophers are surprised that there is something rather than nothing precisely because it would be simpler if there was nothing—as Leibniz famously put it, “a nothing is simpler and easier than a something” (1714 [1714]: 262, §7). These philosophers seem to be surprised that a particular grounding explanation involving a subjunctive conditional does not obtain, namely a grounding explanation wherein there is nothing in virtue of the fact that it would be more complex if there was something. If these philosophers regard this grounding explanation as intelligible, they should regard the proposed grounding explanations discussed above intelligible as well
My main goal in this paper is to identify a type of explanation which might in principle serve as an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing, and it is of secondary importance whether that type of explanation should be classified as a grounding explanation

Summary

Introduction

This paper concerns the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The words “why is there something rather than nothing?” have been used to ask a number of distinct questions (Brenner 2016)—e.g., “why are there any contingent things?”, “why are there any concrete things?”, “why does anything whatsoever exist?” Despite the fact that the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” can be read in multiple ways, it will often prove useful to understand this sentence as if it refers to a single determinate question. In what follows I’ll sometimes refer to the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” as “the Question.”. There are two construals of the Question which interest me in this paper: 1.why does anything concrete exist? In what follows I’ll sometimes refer to the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” as “the Question.” There are two construals of the Question which interest me in this paper: 1.why does anything concrete exist? and 2.why does anything whatsoever exist?1

Brenner

Why is the Question so Intractable?

Grounding Answers to the Question

Objections and Responses

Conclusion