Explaining Theory Choice: An Assessment of the Critical Realist Contribution to Explanation in Science

Abstract

This paper analyses the critical realist account of explanation and theory choice by considering Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality. I criticise his concept explanatory power for having a quantitative bias which obscures the existence of different types of explanation, for being vaguely defined and too abstract to be of help to practising social scientists in the business of choosing theories. I show this with the help of an example from economics which leads me to discuss Lawson's characterisation of economic theory, which, I argue, places too much emphasis on methodological factors and is insensitive to the themata of economics. I go on to consider Roy Bhaskar's writings on theory choice and his attempt to argue not just for the possibility, but also the reality of rational theory choice in science. I show how Bhaskar is unable to support this claim independently of the de facto theory choices of sciences. With the aid of an example, I cast doubt on the ability of Bhaskar's conception of theory choice to provide normative guidance to scientists. I finish by questioning the notion of theory choice and its implications.