Explaining the role of norms and rationality in codeswitching

Abstract

When does rationality favor making an unmarked choice versus a marked choice in codeswitching and vice versa? Within the framework of rational actor models (e.g., Elster 1979, 1989) and Lessig's (1995) examination of the regulation and construction of social meaning, the paper shows how the potency of unmarked choices is derived from existing norms and how selecting the marked choice is an attempt to construct new norms. Rational actor models (including the markedness model of Myers-Scotton, 1993, 1998) take account of large-scale societal factors, but not as directly determining linguistic choices. Rather, selection is located with the individual, and rationality itself is the mechanism by which choices are made. To act rationally means that a choice reflects a goal to enhance rewards and minimize costs - to optimize one's returns, given the prevailing circumstances. To engage in codeswitching at all is an instance of speakers acting rationally because codeswitching makes optimal use of the resources in their linguistic repertoires. When the switch is a marked choice, the message is that the speaker is attempting to construct a new social meaning for the speaker's own persona or the import of the ongoing discourse, thereby negotiating a new norm.