Explaining Suicide Bombings

Abstract

Suicide bombings are one of the deadliest tools used by violent non-state actors in the twenty-first century’s conflicts. They have been used as guerrilla tactics, aimed at military and diplomatic targets in the context of wider-scale war, and as terrorist attacks aimed at civilian and noncombatant targets in times of relative peace. In the process, suicide bombings have captured much attention—as their organizers intended. Some of this attention has been devoted to understanding why a subset of violent non-state actors use suicide bombings and how they may be stopped. Much can be learned from three cases in which suicide bombings were effectively countered. Israel achieved a marked reduction in suicide bombings with the end of the second Palestinian intifada. Israel did not defeat the militants responsible for these bombings; rather, Israel interfered with their operations and blocked their access to Israeli targets. Similarly, suicide bombings declined dramatically in Lebanon and Sri Lanka as each country emerged from civil war. The Lebanese groups that used suicide bombings survived, though their resistance relied far less on these tactics. In Sri Lanka, in contrast, the group responsible for suicide bombings was defeated. Suicide bombings continued to spread elsewhere and have returned to Lebanon and Sri Lanka (though, they never completely ceased in Lebanon) with new perpetrators and new targets. While informative, the cases also point to limitations in countering suicide bombings. One limitation is the fact that suicide bombings are a tool that can be, and has been, adopted by new militant groups seeking to maximize their coercive capacity.