Abstract
PurposeThis study attempts to figure out the factors that contributed to deposing certain elected presidents before the end of their constitutional terms, alongside tracing the new political context that prevailed in Latin America since 1978 and its impact on direct political participation and military behavior during presidential crises.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses the comparative method to investigate the causes of presidential instability in three case studies.FindingsThe likelihood of presidential instability increases when a president enacts austerity economic policies that marginalize large sectors of the citizenry, becomes implicated in acts of corruption and develops a hostile relationship with members of the ruling coalition.Originality/valueThis study integrates the social movement theory with analytical perspectives from parliamentary behavior to explain presidential instability. It attempts to investigate the dynamics of interaction between the acts of furious citizens and disloyal legislators through the in-depth analysis of three case studies.
Highlights
By the mid-1940s, William Stokes (1945) highlighted the phenomenon of “Democratic Caesarism”, arguing that Latin American presidents enjoyed almost total hegemony over the political process and were unaccountable to other institutions
Many scholars argue that since the 1990s, Latin America has undergone a new pattern of political instability, by which they mean several elected presidents were toppled before the end of their constitutional terms
In the majority of presidential crises that took place after the third wave of democratization, the army preferred to remain quartered and neutral, refraining from quelling public demonstrations or declaring its support to one competing faction over another. This new pattern of military behavior has contributed to the persistence of democracy in Latin America and signaled the new political context that prevailed in the continent after the third wave of democratization (Pion-Berlin, 2008)
Summary
By the mid-1940s, William Stokes (1945) highlighted the phenomenon of “Democratic Caesarism”, arguing that Latin American presidents enjoyed almost total hegemony over the political process and were unaccountable to other institutions. Half a century later, Linz (1990) wrote his article about “the perils of presidentialism”, noting that the presidential system is more prone to gridlock and lack of institutional cooperation, inviting military intervention. In several Latin American countries, the parliament toppled the president, often amid massive popular mobilization. Many scholars argue that since the 1990s, Latin America has undergone a new pattern of political instability, by which they mean several elected presidents were toppled before the end of their constitutional terms. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http:// creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode
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