Explaining NATO enlargement1

Abstract

Summary America's current status as the world's only remaining superpower and its dominant position in NATO are key to understanding why the alliance is expanding. NATO's unique organizational attributes and good track record also help explain why NATO became the preferred vehicle for advancing American interests. The failure of the OSCE and other organizations to manage problems in former Yugoslavia made it clear that NATO still remained America's best option in Europe. In addition, by expanding the alliance, the US was able to extend its influence further into eastern Europe while simultaneously reducing Russia's influence in the region. A number of domestic factors also help explain why NATO is enlarging. America's superpower status and more than half a century of internationalism have created a domestic consensus that the US must continue to play a leadership role in international politics. This view is shared by the public and elites alike, and by both Republicans and Democrats. The Clinton administration also felt pressure from special interests, including groups that represent eastern European immigrants and their descendants, as well as from the arms industry. Although these domestic groups did not drive the policy, they certainly did raise the immediate political costs for opposing it. While many factors point in the direction of NATO enlargement, the policy was not over‐determined or inevitable. There is good reason to believe that another administration would have delayed enlargement or prevented it all together. Most members of the foreign policy establishment were against the policy. There was widespread fear that the policy was too costly and would damage Russia's relations with the West. Whereas the Clinton administration turned the PFP framework into a fire‐ladder that facilitated the entry of eastern European countries into NATO, other administrations may have used the PFP as firewall to keep them out. Even if one believes that enlargement was inevitable, several of the preceding essays make it clear that President Clinton and his key advisers ensured that the policy happened much sooner than it would have, perhaps by as much as a decade. The preceding essays take a step towards filling the gap that currently exists between the realm of international relations theory and the study of foreign policy. This volume was fundamentally motivated by trying to answer a series of questions about an important foreign policy outcome; it was not motivated by the desire to advance any particular theory for its own sake. Various approaches were applied in a non‐dogmatic way, often treated more like conceptual frameworks than theories. While some might be uncomfortable with combining, modifying, or even stretching theories, this is better than the common alternative, which is to force the facts to fit the theory. In many ways, by being problem‐driven rather than theory‐driven, the strengths and weakness of IR theory become even more apparent. No approach to international relations could be taken off the shelf and applied to this important event without significant modification and, in most cases, without being supplemented by another approach. In the case of NATO enlargement ‐ as is the case in all foreign policy outcomes ‐ variables operating at all three levels of analysis are at work. While this point is simple and should not come as a surprise, it is often overlooked or obscured because of how various debates have unfolded. All too often, constructing and refining theory is more highly regarded than making sense of an important event. This is unfortunate since IR theory ‐ by design ‐ offers only partial explanations. Asking which approach is better or which level of analysis is most useful is important, but all too often this endeavour has crowded out other pursuits. It is also important to learn how to use existing approaches together in order to offer more thorough and complete explanations of important events. This volume takes a step in that direction.