Explaining Military Coups D'Etat: Black Africa, 1957-1984

Abstract

Military coups and related problems of political control in Third World countries present a major obstacle to economic and social development. We evaluate a synthetic theory of military coups derived from political development theory, military centrality arguments, several theories of ethnic antagonism, and economic dependency theory. Using data on military interventions in 33 Black African states between 1957 and 1984, we carry out a LISREL analysis of the structural propensity for military coups. Wefind strong support for modernization and competition theories of ethnic antagonisms, military centrality theory and aspects of dependency theory. Political development theory is not supported. Ethnic diversity and competition, military centrality, debt dependence, and political factionalism are major predictors of coup activity. Military centrality is, in turn, rooted in the same underlying structures. Ethnic dominance is a stabilizing force creating social integration and weakening opposition. Intractable conflicts rooted in ethnic competition and economic dependence appear to create a structural contextfor military coups and related instabilities.