Abstract
The central purpose of this paper is to examine firms' vertical integration decisions as a consequence of strategic choices within an explicit market environment. I show that a unique equilibrium number of unintegrated downstream firms exists when the intermediate-good market is imperfectly competitive and nonintegration leads to savings in fixed costs. The outcome may be one in which some firms produce the intermediate good internally while others do not, despite the fact that all firms have identical ex ante opportunity sets. Thus, my results provide an explanation for intraindustry differences in the vertical organization of firms.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
