Explaining differences in ministerial ménages à trois: multiple bargains in Belgium and Denmark

Abstract

While special advisers play an important role in most Western governments, the research on the subject is limited. This article aims to explain variations in the ménage à trois relationships between ministers, senior civil servants and special advisers in two different politico-administrative systems. The theoretical starting point is to conceptualize and explain such trilateral relationships as multiple Public Service Bargains. We find that the differences in Public Service Bargains generate differences in these ménages à trois relationships, resulting in different types of functional differentiation as well as differences in the degree of cooperation vis-à-vis conflict. These differences are primarily the result of differences in the interests as well as formal, institutional rules and the competencies of the actors involved. The empirical data include documents as well as interviews with and questionnaires completed by senior civil servants. The countries compared are Belgium and Denmark. Points for practitioners Our study confirms that it is important for a ‘ménage à trois’ (ministers, special advisers, SCSs) ‘… to spell out the terms of the bargain applying to political advisers (…)’ ( Hood and Lodge, 2006 : 128) in order to regulate the relationship between special advisers and SCSs and avoid potential conflicts among them. In addition, the study shows that the number of political appointments plays a role in the relationship. Finally, the study shows that clear differences in the competencies brought to the bargain by the two types of agent may ensure cooperation and mutual respect, whereas an overlapping of competencies may cause rivalry.