Abstract

Definite descriptions with reference failure have been argued to give rise to different truth-value intuitions depending on the local linguistic context in which they appear. We conducted an experiment to investigate these alleged differences, thereby contributing new data to the debate. We have found that pragmatic strategies dependent on verification and topicalisation, suggested in the context of trivalent/partial theories, indeed play a role in people's subjective judgments. We discuss the consequences of these findings for all major approaches to definite descriptions (i.e. Russellian, Strawsonian, pragmatic). Finally, we offer a discussion of the relative contribution of verificational and topicality effects on truth values, reaching the conclusion that verification is primarily relevant and topicality is dependent on that. We thus support von Fintel's (2004) position on the primacy of verification, but not his dismissal of topicality as a factor. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.6.10 BibTeX info

Highlights

  • According to Russell (1905, 1957), sentences with definite descriptions entail the existence of a unique individual that satisfies the description

  • Stalnaker 1974, 1978) is that sentences with definite descriptions entail the existence of a unique individual satisfying the description and in addition require that the existence of a unique referent be presupposed

  • We calculated the proportion of TRUE, CAN’T SAY and FALSE responses for each condition

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Summary

Introduction

According to Russell (1905, 1957), sentences with definite descriptions entail the existence of a unique individual that satisfies the description. When such an individual does not exist, as in (1), the sentence is false. His proposal (which can be traced back to Frege 1892) was that definite descriptions instead of asserting, presuppose the existence of a unique individual that satisfies the description: when this presupposition is not met, the question of truth or falsity does not even arise and so the sentence does not have a truth-value. A third possibility (cf. Stalnaker 1974, 1978) is that sentences with definite descriptions entail the existence of a unique individual satisfying the description and in addition require that the existence of a unique referent be presupposed

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