Abstract
The existing research on forestry infrastructure has focused on suggestions from other areas of forestry research: that forestry infrastructure should be completed and improved. However, research on forestry infrastructure is relatively rare. In the real world, there are various problems with creating forestry infrastructure, such as complex approval procedures for facility construction, irrational facility layout, insufficient funding for facility construction, and conflicts between the nature of land used for facility construction and the nature of forest land. This paper uses game theory to analyze the behavior of forest infrastructure goods suppliers. Relevant parameters related to forest area infrastructure were designed, including communication, environmental certainty, information feedback, and reward and punishment mechanisms, and experimental economics methods were used to simulate accurate behavior regarding the supply of goods. Then, the key factors that affect the provision of quasi-public goods for forestry infrastructure were studied. At the end of the paper, some targeted suggestions that distinguish rural infrastructure from general infrastructure are given.
Highlights
Forestry infrastructure refers to engineering facilities for forestry public services that provide economic, social, and ecological benefits, such as paths for cycling, tool storerooms, and transfer facilities
Note: NC indicates that players could not communicate with each other, and C indicates that they could communicate with each other; F indicates that there was information feedback, and NF indicates that there was no information feedback; U indicates that the environment was determined, and NU indicates that the environment was uncertain; P indicates that there were reward and punishment measures, and NP indicates that there were no reward and punishment measures
Two main issues were studied in this paper: (1) Which is better, cooperation or noncooperation? (2) What are the key factors affecting the private, voluntary supply of goods for forestry infrastructure? The following was found: (1) With private cooperation, the supply was higher than with private noncooperation
Summary
Forestry infrastructure refers to engineering facilities for forestry public services that provide economic, social, and ecological benefits, such as paths for cycling, tool storerooms, and transfer facilities. In terms of research on the supply of quasi-public goods, most scholars have used game theory [39,40,41,42,43]. This paper draws on existing research and uses game theory to analyze the supply mechanisms of quasi-public goods for forestry infrastructure. Other scholars have applied punishment mechanisms to the study of the impact of information feedback on the supply of public goods [53,54]. Using the above-mentioned research, we combined the characteristics of the supply of goods for forestry infrastructure: communication, information feedback, environment determination, and reward and punishment mechanisms. This paper uses game theory to study the supply mechanisms of quasi-public goods for forestry infrastructure and uses experimental economics to verify the theoretical results. We verify the main factors that affect cooperative games
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
