EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES OF BARGAINING

Abstract

This study was done to investigate the relationship between bargaining and communication in a Deutsch and Krauss-type bargaining game. The study consisted of two experiments.First experiment aimed to examin basic conditions of the game. 40 Ss were used to study the effects of communication opportunities with and without gates. After each trial, Ss could communicate each other through a written message. The content was at their disposal. Results showed that the bilateral gate interfered with coordination, but communication opportunities facilitated coordination, too. Furthermore, the effects of communication was shown more clearly in the gate condition. It was suggested that the direct communication changed Ss' perception of their bargaining situation.It was hypothesized that communication opportunities would not affect coordination under the explicit definition of situations. To test this hypothesis, a second experiment was run by 40 Ss. Ss' perception of the situation was introduced by the change in the content of 4 practice trials. In the condition of the cooperative definition of situation, it was emphasized that the alternate use of one-lane road was advantageous for both and gates could be used as coordination device. While, in the condition of the competitive definition of situation, confrontation, the use of gates for obstruction, and taking the alternate route were emphasized. In each of these conditions, half of Ss could communicate with each other. Results supported the prediction. Ss' perception of the situation strongly affected the course of bargaining. The cooperative perception of the situation facilitated coordination. While communication opportunities could not affect the outcome, more detailed analyses of bargaining behavior proved that in the condition of the competitive definition of situation, communication opportunities carried bargaining to extremes.