Experiment and speculation in seventeenth-century Italy: The case of Geminiano Montanari

Alberto Vanzo

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.001

Abstract

This paper reconstructs the natural philosophical method of Geminiano Montanari, one of the most prominent Italian natural philosophers of the late seventeenth century. Montanari's views are used as a case study to assess recent claims concerning early modern experimental philosophy. Having presented the distinctive tenets of seventeenth-century experimental philosophers, I argue that Montanari adheres to them explicitly, thoroughly, and consistently. The study of Montanari's views supports three claims. First, experimental philosophy was not an exclusively British phenomenon. Second, in spite of some portrayals of experimental philosophy as an ‘atheoretical’ or ‘purely descriptive’ enterprise, experimental philosophers could consistently endorse a variety of natural philosophical explanations and postulate theoretical entities. Third, experimental philosophy and mechanical philosophy were not, as such, antagonistic. They could be consistently combined in a single philosophical enterprise.

Highlights

In spite of some portrayals of experimental philosophy as an ‘atheoretical’ or ‘purely descriptive’ enterprise, experimental philosophers could consistently endorse a variety of natural philosophical explanations and postulate theoretical entities
Several recent studies on early modern natural philosophy have charted the origins and fortunes of a movement formed by selfprofessed experimental philosophers, from Robert Boyle (Chalmers, 2012) and John Locke (Anstey, 2011) to Irish and Scottish societies (Gomez, 2012; Hemmens, 2015)
This paper provides one such case study

Summary

Introduction

Montanari’s views are used as a case study to assess recent claims concerning early modern experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophy allows for the possibility to make a provisional, weak, or tentative commitment to substantive claims and theories before carrying out experiments and observations. The reason is that, as is the case for Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke,27 experiments and observations have the same primary function in Montanari’s natural philosophy: providing ‘historical material’28 which is the basis for explanations.

Results

Conclusion