Abstract

AbstractCriticisms of nudging suggest that nudges infringe on decision makers’ autonomy. Yet, little empirical research has explored whether people who are subjected to nudges agree. In three between-group experiments (N = 2083), we subject participants to contrasting choice architectures and measure experiences of autonomy, choice-satisfaction, perceived threat to freedom of choice, and objection to the choice architecture. Participants who received a prosocial opt-out default nudge made more prosocial choices but did not report lower autonomy or choice satisfaction than participants in opt-in default or active-choice conditions. This was the case even when the presence of the nudge was disclosed, and when monetary choice stakes were introduced. With monetary choice stakes, participants perceived the threat to freedom of choice as slightly higher in the nudge condition than in the other conditions, but objection to the choice architecture did not differ between the conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that default nudges are less manipulative and autonomy-infringing than sometimes feared. We recommend that policymakers include measures of choice experiences when testing out new interventions.

Highlights

  • Unethical behavior change interventions should not be used for policy

  • All analyses were conducted as analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparisons between choice format conditions, unless otherwise stated

  • Study 1 found that while structuring the choice in an opt-out format had a sizeable influence on choices, participants’ experiences of autonomy, choice-satisfaction, and perceived threat to freedom of choice did not significantly differ from those subjected to an opt-in or active-choice format

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Summary

Introduction

Unethical behavior change interventions should not be used for policy. The class of policy interventions known as nudges, interventions influencing behavior by changing cues in choice environments, have received much attention from fears that they may fail to live up to ethical standards (for book-length discussions, see Rebonato, 2012; Conly, 2013; White, 2013; Sunstein, 2014, 2015, 2016). A second considers nudging paternalistic, overriding people’s means or ends for ones preferred by the nudger. Central to both charges is that nudging is claimed to pay insufficient respect to individuals’ autonomy

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