Abstract

National Grid is the electricity system operator in Great Britain and has an unique feature in so far as it is one of the world’s few for-profit system operators. In addition, the commercially orientation of the British market rules means that nearly every action taken by National Grid to operate the system has a cost associated to it. Based on those factors and in order to encourage National Grid to seek continuous improvements and drive for efficient and economic system operation, the regulator (Ofgem) offers an incentive scheme, whereby a target is agreed annually and any savings in relation to this target are shared between consumers and National Grid in the form of a profit. It is in National Grid’s best interest to have mechanisms to mitigate the impacts of volatility in the costs it faces as system operator so that it can implement cost saving actions without the risk of windfall losses (or gains) arising from sudden changes in uncontrollable drivers. The purpose of this paper is to share the experiences of National Grid in the operation of Great Britain's electricity system, with a special interest on the mechanisms created to manage the associated costs in response to the incentive scheme. It does so by describing the market operation in Great Britain and the costs drivers impacting National Grid’s system operation and illustrating the steps recently taken by National Grid to propose volatility mitigation mechanisms. It concludes with the rationale and expected results from the latest proposals as consulted with the industry for introduction in the incentive scheme starting on 1st April 2011. It is worth noting that with this work, the authors wish to both share the experience with other system operators and regulators in the world, as well as give British market participants an insight on the inner workings of National Grid.

Highlights

  • National Grid Electricity Transmission owns and operates the high voltage electricity system in England and Wales and is the National Electricity Transmission System Operator in Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) and the Offshore networks

  • Whilst the bulk of National Grid’s revenue is due to its function as owner of the transmission system, this paper focus solely on the costs and revenues related to its role as system operator

  • Because Balancing Services Incentive Scheme (BSIS) has so far been based in setting a cost target prior to the start of the scheme, variations in costs caused by swings in uncontrollable drivers lead to potential windfall gains and losses, which counters any real incentive for National Grid to deliver innovations in system operation

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Summary

Disclaimers

The introduction part of this paper has been based on a text co-authored by one of the authors as published in the proceedings of CIDEL 2010

Introduction
Current Market Arrangements in Great Britain
Introduction of BETTA
Energy Related Costs
Constraints
Incentivisation in Action
Cost Volatility
A New Formulation for NIA
The Downfall of New NIA
Proposed Innovations in the Incentive Scheme
Ex-Post Inputs
Longer Term Scheme
Conclusions

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