Abstract
The multidimensional framework to the study of consciousness, which comes as an alternative to a single sliding scale model, offers a set of experimental paradigms for investigating dimensions of animal consciousness, acknowledging the compelling urge for a novel approach. One of these dimensions investigates whether non-human animals can flexibly and spontaneously plan for a future event, and for future desires, without relying on reinforcement learning. This is a critical question since different intentional structures for action in non-human animals are described as served by different neural mechanisms underpinning the capacity to represent temporal properties. And a lack of appreciation of this variety of intentional structures and neural correlates has led many experts to doubt that animals have access to temporal reasoning and to not recognize temporality as a mark of consciousness, and as a psychological resource for their life. With respect to this, there is a significant body of ethological evidence for planning abilities in non-human animals, too often overlooked, and that instead should be taken into serious account. This could contribute to assigning consciousness profiles, across and within species, that should be tailored according to an implemented and expansive use of the multidimensional framework. This cannot be fully operational in the absence of an additional tag to its dimensions of variations: the experience-specificity of consciousness.
Highlights
Cognition varies extensively in nature as individuals adapt to the specific challenges they experience in life (Irwin, 2020)
The recent multidimensional framework to the study of consciousness (Birch et al, 2020), which comes as an alternative to a single sliding scale model, offers a set of experimental paradigms for investigating dimensions of animal consciousness, acknowledging the compelling urge for a novel approach
One of these dimensions investigates whether non-human animals can flexibly and spontaneously plan for a future event, and for future desires, without relying on reinforcement learning. This is a critical question since different intentional structures for action in non-human animals are described as served by different neural mechanisms underpinning the capacity to represent temporal properties (Cai et al, 2012; Mayo and Sommer, 2013; Schormans et al, 2017; Feenders and Klump, 2018; Perry and Chittka, 2019; Viera and Margolis, 2019)
Summary
Cognition varies extensively in nature as individuals adapt to the specific challenges they experience in life (Irwin, 2020). In addition to the threefold structure of the stone hurling planned activity, there are two distinct behaviors to be highlighted: firstly, the chimpanzee’s ability to appreciate whether a given object falls within or outside of the visual field and space of action of a potentially competing third part, and how this affects the structure of the plan of action; secondly, the chimpanzee’s awareness of the fact that repressing its own dominant attitude could bring an advantage toward the achievement of the intended outcome These two behaviors exemplify the capacity for cross-temporally referential connectivity, individuated by Bratman (1987, 2014), that is the feature of intentions that characterizes these mental states as both backward and forward-looking. I wanted to explain how, through a Rich Temporal Integration Approach, consciousness can be observed in various species and how nonhuman animals can be assigned a consciousness profile tailored according to the specificity of their experience
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