Abstract

, 11/1: 81-86. Please consult the published version for purposes of quotation. We see two clusters of questions arising out of the papers in this issue. The first cluster concerns the role of experience in the explanation of delusions. Do abnormal experiences play a central role in accounting for delusions, or are they at best only marginal? And if experience plays a central role in accounting for delusions, exactly what role does it play? The second cluster of questions concerns the interpretability of delusions. Are delusional utterances meaningful, or are they mere noises? And if they are meaningful, what makes it the case that they are meaningful?

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