Abstract
There is a strong theoretical supposition in the political science literature that civil unrest in a political jurisdiction is a consequence of the ‘relative deprivation’ of the population within its borders. This proposition is tested empirically in this paper, with respect to incidence of attempted coups d'etat across fifty-four countries in 1981. The findings suggest that relative economic deprivation does precipitate political unrest. Social deprivation, as measured by repression of the population, also incites a demand for political change, although repression has a predictable supply-side effect of dampening the population's ability to translate demand for political change into actuality.
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