Abstract
Public agencies are frequently constrained to procure goods and services in sealed tender markets. Pricing decisions of firms participating in such markets have been analyzed for both static and dynamic situations [1; 7; 11]. As might be anticipated, the decision rules obtained in these analyses depend in an integral way on the firm's perception of the behavior of other market participants. It is this aspect of the pricing problem to which our paper is directed. A model is developed which can accommodate formulations based upon alternative expectations mechanisms and more traditional forms of market organization. Implications of alternative hypotheses as to expectations mechanisms and market structures are explored as they relate to pricing decisions by firms and market bid distributions.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
