Abstract
This study of the death penalty decisions made by justices of the California Supreme Court between 1979 and 1990 elaborates on the integrated model used to explain judicial behavior. Specifically, the interactive effects of judicial ideology, case characteristics, the political environment, the dynamic effects of legal issues, and the effects of retention elections are explored. The model does provide a useful explanation of judicial behavior. In addition, this study indicates that the effects of legal arguments and case facts are conditioned by judicial ideology, that the effects of legal issues change over time, and that electoral pressures do not have a uniform effect across judges.
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