Abstract
Tax competition may have a detrimental impact on efficient public goods' supply and redistribution and a positive role in constraining a self-interested government. The Tiebout model considers only the exit option as a means of expressing consumer discontent. Another possibility for voters in a democracy is exerting voice in the decision-making process. This paper analyzes tax competition between the 26 Swiss states in 1990 and considers the impact of referenda to control budgetary decision-making. The results describe the degree of exerting voice in a tax referendum and the feedback on tax competition.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
