Exit from open‐ended social benefits into employment: Access to work, active labour market policies and work intensity

Abstract

AbstractAn analysis is made of the sensitivity of minimum income schemes to the effects of labour market participation and active labour market services. Data comes from the only regional scheme in Spain that has an open‐ended duration and has existed for a period long enough to be analysed. This scheme shows the closest resemblance with the first national minimum income programme, introduced by the Spanish government in 2020 (Ingreso Mínimo Vital). Survival analysis results show that people who access full‐time work contracts have a higher probability of exiting into employment than those who do not, although the majority of people who sign at least one contract remain in the scheme, nevertheless. A defining element for exiting the scheme is work intensity. Thus, despite the fact that the scheme is compatible with some jobs, results suggest that increasing the compatibility between work and benefit would be a crucial factor in facilitating exit from the scheme. In addition, analyses of the elements defining the probability of signing a work contract while on the benefit show that active labour market policies heighten said probability, but do not subsequently influence exit from the scheme.