Exit as a Process

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 2 analyses Israel’s withdrawal from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Unlike other cases examined here, Israel did not leave the territory in one comprehensive exit. Instead, this chapter emphasizes three agreements that each caused Israel to leave the Sinai in an increasingly salient process of withdrawal: the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement, the 1975 Sinai Interim Agreement, and the 1979 Camp David Accords. Existing literature frequently stresses the Camp David talks that produced the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and stresses the agency of leaders, such as Israel’s Menachem Begin. Breaking with this narrative, this chapter argues that Israel left the Sinai in spite of, not because of, Begin. It portrays the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the culmination of an incremental process that began in 1974, with the Separation of Forces Agreement. This agreement was the first time that Israel implemented territorial withdrawal, in exchange for non-belligerency concessions from a rival.