Abstract
ABSTRACTThis paper uses the case of telecommunications deregulation to construct a model of interest group behavior in bureaucratic‐legislative policymaking. The model posits three common policymaking arenas: closed, open, and the transformational period between the two. Three features of these policymaking arenas are explored: (1) changes in the numbers of interested actors, leading to (2) changes in the policy‐making environment and to (3) the shifting strategic interests of actors. Borrowing the concepts of “voice” and “exit” from Hirschman (1970), alternative interest group strategies are found to occur in different policymaking environments, or arenas, which in turn depend in significant part on the numbers of interested actors involved. Voice works when interests are or appear to be relatively complementary. Exit is used when voice fails, that is, in permeable arenas of many actors with conflicting interests.
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