Abstract
AbstractThe present study develops a multi‐agent communication model involving participation decisions to address customer complaint behaviour and the corresponding management policy. Privately informed customers choose among complaining, which is costly, keeping silent and exiting. A firm determines complaint barriers and decides whether to undertake corrective action. It is shown that customers truthfully complain only under a moderate complaint barrier. The observed low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio and costly complaints arise as one equilibrium outcome. Customers' expectations, the precision of signals and the temptation of outside options are identified as the determinants of complaint management policy. Firms are likely to set socially‐excessive complaint barriers.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
