Existential Phenomenology and the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds

Abstract

AbstractWe ordinarily think that self and other coexist as subjects with mutually exclusive mental lives. The conceptual problem of other minds challenges this common thought by raising doubts that coexistence and mutual exclusivity come together in a coherent idea of others. Existential phenomenology is usually taken to be exempt from skeptical worries of this sort because it conceives of subjects as situated or embodied, offering an inclusive account of coexistence. I submit that this well‐entrenched view faces a serious dilemma: either the ordinary distinction between self and other has to be given up, or accounts of situated and embodied coexistence presuppose a non‐phenomenological solution to (a close relative of) the conceptual problem of other minds. I then propose a way out for existential phenomenology by sketching a Sartre‐inspired phenomenological response to the problem.