Abstract
A model of the durable-goods monopolist is considered in which the monopolist's output is an exhaustible resource. With exhaustibility the monopolist may effectively precommit himself to a range of future production levels. It is shown that this possibility for precommitment may dramatically alter the nature of the durable-goods monopoly equilibrium.
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