Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to analyze the relevance of the exercise of ownership rights on the management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).Design/methodology/approachThe author exploited a “natural experiment” observed in Uruguay. The author developed an empirical method that to compare the results of SOEs between two five-year presidential terms with de facto differences with regard to the exercise of ownership rights.FindingsThe author found evidence suggesting that the poor exercise of ownership rights has a negative impact on the results of SOEs.Research limitations/implicationsThe results of this study are based exclusively on the Uruguayan case and are limited to the comparison between two five-year terms.Practical implicationsA holding of SOEs that holds and exerts ownership rights emerges as a natural alternative to improve efficiency.Originality/valueThe exercise of ownership rights in SOEs has a significant impact on its performance indicators.

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