Exemplars and Analogies: A Comment on Crane's Study of Kuhnian Paradigms in High Energy Physics

Abstract

In her study of the applicability of Kuhn's ideas to theoretical high energy physics (THEP), Diana Crane emphasizes the importance of Kuhn's concept of an 'exemplar' .' Exemplars, she observes, 'are in some respects the most important elements in the Kuhnian paradigm.'2 In this Response I want to reinforce this remark by suggesting that one can hope to arrive at a deeper understanding of the social construction of scientific knowledge through consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of exenmplary achievements. In particular, I want to suggest that it would be fruitful to recognize that an exemplar is primarily the embodiment of an analogy. Before we come to that, however, it will be useful to review briefly Crane's approach to scientific development. Through interviews with leading physicists, Crane identifies the major lines of inquiry which dominated THEP in the period from 1960 to 1975, and she argues that the 'theoretical innovations which give rise to new lines of inquiry in the field are performing roles analogous to those attributed by Kuhn to exemplars.'3 Using interviews and citation counts, Crane then analyzes the intensity and duration of the response of the THEP community to various exemplars, and argues that variations of response are indicative of values prevalent amongst theorists. Qualities particularly valued in exemplars, she suggests, are breadth and, above all, testability. The image of scientific development implicit in Crane's work is thus essentially this: in the continual flux of scientific theorizing, innovations are occasionally perceived, and, once perceived, evaluated against the standards of breadth and testability. The effort devoted by theorists to the elaboration of exemplary achievement is dependent on the outcome of such evaluations. Now, while such an image might be accepted as a broad description of the development of THEP from 1960 to 1975, whether it also stands as an explanation is not so clear. One might ask, for instance: 1. Why is one piece of theoretical work rather than another perceived to be an innovation by the THEP community; that is to say, what are the distinguishing characteristics of innovations? 2. Once an innovation has been so perceived, can one attempt to understand the details of its subsequent elaboration within the scientific community, or must one be content with an understanding of only the overall characteristics of the response, as is provided by Crane?