Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper attempts to understand whether there is alignment between executive remuneration and shareholder interests in publicly listed companies in Australia. The issue is analysed over three distinct stages of an economic cycle, and the panel fixed effects method is used to estimate the performance-remuneration models. The study finds that the long-term compoents of the remuneration package would highly incentivize CEOs and executive directors. Still, the fixed salary component exerts no such enticement for them to maximize shareholders’ wealth. This new information could be useful for Australian firms as well as for firms in Asia Pacific countries due to the close relationship they share with the Australian firms.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
