Abstract
The actions that can lawfully be taken by the executive branch in a federation depend on the intersection of two aspects of constitutional design. One is the allocation of legislative and executive power for federal purposes. The other is the scope of executive power under the prevailing understanding of a separation of powers, including the scope of the power that can be exercised by the executive without the authority of the legislature. There are significant variations between the federal systems of the world in relation to both sets of arrangements, making comparative work on federal executive power a particularly challenging task. This essay explores some of the principal variations along each of these two axes as a starting point for comparative scholarship in the field. It also demonstrates the potential complexity of the point at which they intersect through an in-depth study of the case of Australia, where the scope of federal executive power presently is a topical issue. Following a recent course of judicial decisions, federal executive power in Australia has emerged as a compound concept that cannot fully be understood by considering the principles of federalism and of separation of powers in isolation from each other.
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