Abstract
Until recently Commonwealth governments have been able to have very extensive executive intrusions in public sector audit accepted largely as benign and untainted by political interests, thereby maintaining an illusion of an unfettered, autonomous public sector audit function. An interpretation of independence has been embedded which has been at odds with the operational reality. A conditional form of independence has been promoted as substantive independence and has thereby created multiple and often conflicting beliefs about what is and what ought to be the nature of independence in public sector audit. Differences in the independence of the person of the auditor‐general have been confused with the independence of the office.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
