Abstract
This article examines the relationship between the configuration of core executive institutions, with a particular focus on the position of the prime minister and finance minister, and fiscal performance, defined in terms of the maintenance of aggregate fiscal discipline and the predictability of the budgetary process. The study covers post-communist Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The first wave of institutional reform in these countries followed the transition to democracy and was essentially negative in its impact. It eliminated communist-era institutions that competed with the prime minister and the minister of finance, but left the two in a relatively weak position vis-À-vis their cabinet colleagues. This led to poor performance and serious fiscal crises in the mid-1990s. The second wave of institutional reform arose in response to the fiscal crises and created a more centralized configuration of executive institutions, producing significantly better fiscal performance.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
