Abstract
We examine how compensation of chief executive officer (CEO) and corporate governance practices affect earnings management behavior in an emerging economy, Pakistan. Using 1836 firm-year observations from 260 firms listed in KSE for period 2005 to 2012, we do not find that CEO compensation has significant influence on earnings management behavior however weak evidence is found that CEOs in small firms do manage earnings to increase their compensation. Further, we find that CEO duality is related to improved earnings quality. However, larger boards appear to be related to higher earnings. Thus, larger boards reduce the quality of reported financial information. Furthermore, we find that concentrated ownership is related to higher earnings management. Sub-sample analysis shows that both concentrated and family ownerships are related to income decreasing earnings management. Overall, as policy implications, our findings suggest that earnings management behavior is likely to be conditioned to the contextual settings of the economy under examination.
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