Executive Compensation Complexity and Firm Performance

Abstract

How does the complexity of executive compensation contracts affect firm performance? With unknown consequences, the compensation complexity of executives has been rising. We define and measure executive compensation complexity and relate it to accounting, market, and ESG (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) metrics of firm performance. CEO compensation complexity negatively affects all three types of firm performance. We explore theoretical explanations for this relationship and find that cognitively complex CEOs can better deal with complex contracts. The negative complexity effects disappear if firms use only financial goals. Complexity is more harmful in unstable and munificent industries. Complexity also mitigates the negative effect of CEO tenure on long-term performance. In addition, firm performance suffers if the top management team members have heterogeneously complex contracts. Robustness checks support these findings. We conclude that the trend of adding more metrics to executive compensation contracts is not a generally preferable solution to the new and more intense agency problems that firms encounter.